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To secure social peace is one of the primary objects of law.
There can be no enduring social peace without a generally pre-
vailing belief that all alike may obtain the same measure of jus-
tice in the courts. Whether justified or not, a sustained sense
of unfair treatment by the courts on the part of any vital, pro-
ducing group in the community is a danger of first magnitude.
The signs are all about us that labor groups throughout the
country are smarting with a sense of injustice at the hands of
the courts. Their faith in law and their respect for the courts
are growing less and less every year. The situation calls for
constructive efforts to meet the growing danger, not only on the
part of labor leaders, but on the part of all who believe in
American law and American traditions.
It is the fashion to concentrate attack upon the "labor injunc-
tion." There can be no question but that in the issue of labor
injunctions many courts have abused their powers. Not only
have sweeping injunctions couched in all-inclusive terms been
improvidently granted, only to be vacated by higher courts af-
ter they have served the complainants' purposes, but the injunc-
tion method itself as applied to labor controversies is open to
serious question. For in the field of labor disputes where two
groups, acting collectively, are pitted against each other in a
sharp struggle for supremacy, the situation often reminds one
of the German advance upon Paris in 1914. Time is of the
essence. Delay is defeat. A strike organization falls to pieces
through mere delay and inaction. In such a case the issue of a
temporary injunction or restraining order commonly results,
not, as in ordinary cases, in maintaining the status quo and
thus preventing irreparable injury until a more thorough exam-
ination of the issues can be made, but in virtually awarding
victory in advance by tying the hands of the defendants during
the critical moments of the struggle. A legal machinery which
casts upon a single judge the duty of awarding victory and de-
ciding issues of tremendous social import, not as a result of a
painstaking examination but upon the hazard of mere affidavits
or upon a hurried preliminary hearing, is not a procedure al-
together fitted to achieve social justice.
Quite naturally, therefore, in view of the widespread use and
abuse of injunctions in labor disputes, most of the constructive
efforts of the day to safeguard labor from legal injustice are
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concentrated upon curbing the abuses of the labor injunction.
That part of the Clayton Act which assumed most importance
in the eyes of labor was Section 20 which pertains to the issue
of injunctions. The proposed Shipstead Act is essentially an
anti-injunction bill.' The injunction is made the scapegoat for
all of labor's wrongs; and laboring men have come to be-
lieve that once this evil is done away with, they may expect a
new order and a new judicial day.
But it is a serious question whether the importance, great
as it is, of the injunction in the field of labor law is not being
unduly magnified to the neglect of other sources of legal injus-
tice. May there not be positive danger in this over-exaggeration
Because of the later disillusionment which must be the inevitable
aftermath of such beliefs as are now being nourished in the
effort to pass anti-injunction legislation? If labor groups, are
taught to believe that salvation will come with the enactment
of the Shipstead bill,2 that freed from the danger of injunctions
they may expect a new or different treatment at the hands of
the courts and the end of harsh legal restraint the disillusion-
ment will be bitter. Damage suits can bite even deeper than in-
junction suits; the Danbury Hatters case 3"and the Coronado
cases 4 were suits in which no injunctions were asked or given.
Never has labor been treated by the courts in a more oppressive
way than in England during the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies, at a time when the use of the injunction remedy in labor
disputes was unknown. Many of the American cases of the flrst
half of the nineteenth century, when labor injunctions were still
unthought of, tell the same tale. The injunction, after all, is only
a particular form of remedy. If legal injustice exists, the aboli-
tion of the injunction will surely not end it, but only compel it
to find expression in other channels.
1The proposed Slipstead bill, as drafted by the Sub-committee of the
Senate Committee on Judiciary, -was designed to prevent abuses in the
issue of injunctions, although two of its sections (§§ 3, 6) relate to changes
in the substantive law.
For the text of the proposed bill, see FRNiKFURTEa AND GR-Nn , THE
LABOR INJuxcNTio (1930) 279-288; Frankfurter and Greene, LaboV In-
junction and Federal Legislatio (1929) 42 HAnv. L. Itnv. '766, '795-799.
2 In the last (1929) Annual Convention of the American Federation of
Labor, the committee appointed to study the proposed Shipstead bill, in
recommending its enactment with certain amendments, said:
"It is with the further consideration and approval of the Executive
Council we herewith submit for your approval a legislative proposal which
it is firmly believed... will establish that equality of freedom in our
industrial life and industrial relations as to accord to the wage darners
of America full protection of and in their rights... :
3 Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301 (1908).
IUnited Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344,,42 Sup. C.
587 (1922) ; Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295, 45
Sup. Ct. 551 (1925).
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There seems to be a misconception, fairly widespread among
those without legal -training, that the granting of injunctions
depends entirely upon the personal discretion of the individual
judge,5 and that if the restraining of certain conduct by injunc-
tion, can be prohibited, such conduct will thereby become legal-
ized and permitted. Hence the exaggerated importance of anti-
injunction legislation. Such a notion every lawyer would at
once disclaim; but few trade unionists are lawyers. To the
lawyer it is elementary that no activity can be enjoined which
is not illegal, either in and of itself or as part of a larger illegal
whole 0; that to enjoin strikes or other union activities which
are not of themselves illegal is as unlawful today as it would
be under the Shipstead or any other anti-injunction legislation.
To legalize the strike would be a far more effective and service-
able measure in the interest of labor than to forbid the use of a
strike injunction. The cure, to be effective, must go to the root,
and not simply to the legal remedy.
. When the attempt is made to formulate a concrete program
based upon these ideas the extreme complexity of the subject
becomes apparent. Nevertheless, if labor is to have adequate
legislative protection this problem must be faced. Out of the
complexity will slowly emerge a growing realization that labor
needs legislative protection against injustice in certain, well de-
fined' fields of substantive law, as well as against abuses in the
use of the injunction remedy. It is impossible within the limits
of a brief paper to explore these fields with any kind of thorough-
ness. But a few brief suggestions relating to several distinct
phases of the -problem will help to make the matter concrete.
CONSPIRACY
Because of its vague and elastic limits the crime of con-
spiracy 1 has often been seized upon by reactionary courts as a
convenient means whereby to reach desired convictions of
groups or combinations whose activities were felt to be oppres-
sive but could not be brought within the precise limits of definite
crimes. Since inere combination or concerted action is mani-
Instances of this are to be found on every hand. Compare the follow-
ing quotation from the American Federation of Labor Weekly News
Service, Aug. 17, 1929: "The labor injunction is a strike-breadng weapon.
It is another name for one-man government that this country rejected
when it repudiated the kingly theory."
6As to the few exceptional cases where injunctions may be obtained
although there could be no suit for damages, see Chafee, Does Equity
Follow the La u of Torts (1926)1 75 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 1. These excep-
tional situations, if they' exist, bear little relation to the subject under
discussion.
7 As to the, crime of conspiracy, see Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy (1922)
35 HARV. L. RBv. 393.
[Vol. so
LABOR AND THE COURTS
festly not in and of itself criminal, the crime of conspiracy, it
would seem, must require proof that either the ends pursued
or the means to be utilized are of themselves criminal. It is
quite true that non-criminal activity may become criminal by
force of mere numbers, as in the common law crimes of riot or
unlawful assembly, which require at least three people.8 Never-
theless, if the unlawful assembling of two people is not criminal,
conspiring to assemble two people should not constitute a crime.
If neither the objects sought nor the means to be used are them-
selves criminal, how can the mere conspiring to attain non-
criminal results be criminal? But, unfortunately, courts have
not always confined the crime within these logical limits; it is
commonly said that a conspiring to attain any unlawful, even
though not criminal, end, or to use any unlawful, even though
not criminal, means, constitutes criminal conspiracy. Some
courts have gone even further and hold that a conspiracy is
criminal if its object be merely immoral or contra bonos
inores. So loosely and vaguely has the crime been defined that
the way has been opened for judges to convict defendants acting
in combination who concededly have violated and contemplate
violating no pre-established law but whose activity offends the
innate prejudices of the individual judge. In the Philddelp7W
Cordwains' case,1 ' the court held it a criminal conspiracy for
employees in combination to refuse to work except for higher
wages. When employees later sought to invoke the same doc-
trine against their employers combining to depress wages, they
were told that "a combination to resist oppression not merely
supposed but real, would be perfectly innocent. for where the
act to be done and the means of accomplishing it are lawful, and
the object to be attained is meritorious, combination is not con-
spiracy"; and the court refused to convict the employers unless
they could be proved "to have been actuated by an improper
motive." 2 Similarly, in the later New Jersey case of Ste, e V.
s4 BL. Comm. *146.
9 See statements and cases cited in 2 BisHOP, Nmw CzunNAL IAW
(1923) § 181; 2 WnARTON, CmuNAL LAw (11th ed. 1912) §§ 1600 ct seq.;
8 CYO.- 623; 12 C. T. 548.
:o See, for instance, State v. Burnham., 15 N. H. 396 (1844), vhere Gil-
christ, 3., said:
"When it is said in the books that the means must be unlawful, it is
not to be understood that those means must amount to indictable offences,
in order to make the offence of conspiracy complete. It will be enough
if they are corrupt, dishonest fraudulent, immoral, and in that sense
illegal, and it is in the combination to" make use of such practices that
the dangers of this offence consist." IbZ 403.
1- 3 COMMONS AND GILIORa, DOCU=flNTARY HISTORY OF AMiuRWAN IN-
DUSTR.AL SocInrY (1926) 59-248; SAYB, COLLE ITON OF CAsES ON LABoR
LAw (1922) 99. The case was decided in 1806.
-12 Commonwealth v. Carlisle, Bright. 36 (Pa. 1821). It is interesting
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Donaldson,13 where the defendant employees were indicted for
conspiracy because they had notified their employer that they
would cease working for him unless he discharged certain non-
union employees, the court, although it could find cffininality
neither in the ends pursued nor in the means utilized, never-
theless convicted the defendants, and declared: "It may safely
be said, nevertheless, that a combination will be an indictable
conspiracy .. where the confederacy, having no lawful aim,
tends simply to the oppression of individuals." 4
It was chiefly this vague and ill defined doctrine of conspiracy
to which English courts resorted in their oppressive and harass-
ing treatment of labor groups during the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries. 5 As long as the doctrine of criminal con-
spiracy remains undefined, there will always be a danger of
courts being invoked, especially during periods of reaction, to
punish as criminal associations and groups which for the time
being are unpopular or stir the prejudices of those in power.
Although this danger may be dormant as long as other equally
vague doctrines or laws are available, such as restraint of trade
or the Sherman Act, it is nevertheless real, and should, be met
by affirmative legislation.
The abuse of the doctrine by English courts in the field of
labor law became so great during the nineteenth century that
England passed the Conspiracy Act of 1875,10 providing that:
". . an agreement or combination by two or more persons
to do or procure to be done any act in contemplation or further-
ance of a trade dispute between employers and workmen shall
not be indictable as a conspiracy if such an act committed by
one person would not be punishable as a crime." 'I
The torb of civil conspiracy lends itself to very much the same
kind of abuse. If once the courts hold that the tort includes
concerted action tending "simply to the oppression of individ-
uals," no group whose sphere of activity happens to lie in fields
that this case was decided in the same state as the Philadelphia Cord-
wainers' case.
21 32 N. 3. L. 151 (1867).
14 The court concludes by saying: "In my opinion thia indictment sufll-
ciently shows that the force of the confederates was brought to bear upon
their employer for the purpose of oppression and mischief, and that this
amounts to a conspiracy." Ibid. 156.
5 See 3 STEPHEN, HISTORY or CRImINAL LAW (1883) 203 ot seq.; DICEY,
LAW AND OPINION IN ENGLAND (1905) 96-97; SIDNEY AND BEATRICE WEBB,
HISTORY OF TRADE UNINISm (1920).
20 38 & 39 Vior. c. 86, § 3 (1875).
1 As to this legislation, see 3 STEPHEN, op. cit. aupra. note 15, at 225-
226; Dic y, op. cit. supra note 15, at 267-272; SIDNEY AND BEATRICE NVEnD,
op. cit. supra note 15, at 291 et seq.
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where prejudice runs high will be free from the danger of
damage or injunction suits whose outcome will be left very
largely to the economic and social views of individual judges?8
It was the abuse by English courts of the doctrine of civil con-
spiracy which led to the English legislation of 1906, providing
that:
"An act done in pursuance of an agreement or combination
by two or more persons shall, if done in contemplation or fur-
therance of a trade dispute, not be actionable unless the act if
done without any such agreement or combination, would be
actionable." 3.
In the absence of legislative safeguards, reactionary courts
through the doctrine of criminal or civil conspiracy will always
be provided with a means for curbing the otherwise" lawful
activities of labor unions.20
28 Writing of the use of the doctrine of civil conspiracy in English
courts, Sidney and Beatrice Webb in their Histery of Track Uwiorism
say:
"The Trade Unions in 1875-80, though ... warned by their friendly
legal advisers, had not realised the importance of insisting that the elastic
and indeterminable law of conspiracy should be put on a reasonable foot-
ing; and though they were, by 1891, fairly safe from its use to reinforce
the criminal law, the lawyers found means, under the figment of 'con-
spiracy to injure,' to bring under the head of torts or actionable wrongs
the most ordinary and non-criminal acts of Trade Union officers which
would have been, if done by one person only, without conspiracy, no
ground for legal proceedings. After-ages will be amazed at the flagrant
unfairness with -which the conception of a 'conspiracy to injure, was ap-
plied at the close of the nineteenth century." Tbha 597-598.
- 6 EDw. VII, c. 47, § 1 (1906). See SmNEY AND BATRIc WEB,. Op.
cit. supra note 15, at 607 et seq.
SThe cases in which the doctrine of criminal conspiracy has been
applied in labor cases are too numerous to cite. See AEs, LAW OF
ORGAx=zm LABo An INDusRLrAL CommLimTs (1927) Index, tit. "Criminal
Conspiracy" and references cited. A typical statement of current doctrine
may be found in State v. Stewart, 59 Vt. 273, 9 AtL 559 (1887), where
Powers, J., said:
"The principle upon -which the cases, English and American, proceed,
is, that every man has the right to employ his talents, industry, and capital
as he pleases, free from the dictation of others; and if two or more per-
sons combine to coerce his choice in this behalf, it is a criminal conspiracy.
The labor and sIdil of the workman, be it of high or low degree, the plant
of the manufacturer, the equipment of the farmer, the investments of com-
merce, are all in equal sense property. If. men, by overt acts of violence,
destroy either, they are guilty of crime. The anathemas of a secret or-
ganization of men combined for the purpose of controlling the industry of
others by a species of intimidation that works upon the mind rather than
the body, are quite as dangerous, and generally altogether more effective,
than acts of actual violence. And while such conspiracies may give to
the individual directly affected by them a private right of action -for




The common law doctrine of restraint of trade is even more
shadowy and ill-defined than the doctrine of conspiracy. Count-
less activities which in fact restrain trade are entirely legal.
Because the line between those restraints which are legal -and
those which are illegal is so vague as ta be almost invisible, the
doctrin of illegal restraint of trade, like that of conspiracy,
can in the absence of legislative safeguards always be utilized
to defeat the otherwise lawful activities of trade unions.
That such a possibility is not an idle one seems clear from
the experience of England. After the repeal of the English
Combination Acts in 1824 and 1825 every one supposed that
the legality of trade unions, existing to secure higher wages or
shorter'working hours, was established in England beyond ques-
tion or dispute. For almost half a century this was the uni-
versal assumption. But in 1867 the decision of Hornby v.
Clo1S 21 burst like a bombshell upon the trade union world. In
that decision the Court of Queen's Bench, seizing upon the com-
mon law doctrine of restraint of trade, decided that an ordinary
trade union, existing to secure higher wages and shorter work-
ing hours, was illegal as in restraint of trade. "I am very far
from saying," declared Cockburn, C.J., in deciding, the case,
"that the members of a trades' union constituted for such pur-
poses would bring themselves within the criminal law; but the
rules of such a society would certainly operate in restraint of
trade, and would, therefore, in that sense, be unlawful." By'
this decision, which was followed and approved by later cases,22
the very existence of trade unions was declared illegal as in
restraint of trade. "The hard-earned accumulations of the
larger societies," wrote the Webbs, "by this time amounting to
an aggregate of over a quarter of a million sterling, were at the
mercy of their whole army of branch secretaries and treasurers,
any one of w hom might embezzle the funds with impunity."23
To save the existence of the unions a parliamentary enactment
protecting them from the doctrine of restraint of trade became
imperative. The result was the English Act of 1871, providing
that:
... the purposes of any trade union shall not by reason
geound that the state itself is directly concerned in the promotion of all
legitimate industries and the development of all its resources, and owes
the duty of protection to its citizens engaged iiX the exercise of their call-
ings. The good order, peace, and general prosperity of the state aro
directly involved in the question." Ibid. 289, 9 AtI. ab 568.
21 L. R. 2 Q. B. 153 (1867).
22 See, for instance, Rigby v. Connol, L. R. 14 Ch. D. 482 (1880).
2 3
SINEy AND BEATRICE WEBB, op, cit. supra note 15, at 263.
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merely that they are in restraint of trade, be deemed to be un-
lawful so as to render any member of such trade union liable to
criminal prosecution for conspiracy or otherwise. The pur-
poses of any trade union shall not, by reason merely that they
are in restraint.of trade, be unlawful so as to render void or
voidable any agreement or, trust.2 L
In the United States we have no such legislation.P American
state courts could conceivably at any time overrule former de-
cisions and declare the existence of trade unions illegal as in
restraint of trade. At least one court did so, and ordered the
trade union dissolved. 2l Fortunately, however, this case is not
representative of the American law.T  Although the English
decision of Hanby v. Close has never been accepted as law in
the United States, and in view of the far reaching effects of
such a decision probably never will be, it is not beyond the bounds
of possibility that the doctrine might be accepted in a modified
form. Just as under the Sherman Law combinations in restraint
of trade have been held illegal if they can be shown guilty of
"unfair," although not of themselves illegal, practices, so some
have argued that trade unions should be held illegal if they can
be shown guilty of "unfair," alttiough admittedly not illegal,
practices.
In a word, in American law the restraint of trade doctrine is
rather a possible danger than a present source of injustice. But
in one of its manifestations the doctrine is a source of acute
present.concern to laboring groups. The Sherman Anti-Trust
Act prohibits contracts, combinations and conspiracies in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several states. Although
the Clayton Act declares that "nothing contained in the anti-
trust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and opera-
tion of labor ... organizations," 2 neither the Sherman Act
nor the Clayton Act prevents the federal courts from declaring
illegal as in restraint of trade the actities of labor unions; and
this is being done by federal courts in increasing measure.
Although, as its name indicates, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
was originally! passed primarily to curb the evils of trusts and
massed combinations of capital, it is being used today more and
more as a weapon against combinations of laboring groups. The
24 34 & 35 VIcr. c 31, §§ 2, 3. As to this legislation, see STmEEN, op.
cit. supra note 15, at 224 et seq.; SwDuv AND BE=RicE WEB, op. ci. supra
note 15, at 276 et seq.
= Section 6 of the Clayton Act is applicable only to the federal anti-trust
laws, and does not cover the common law doctrine of zistraint of trade.
Furthermore, it is not, of course, applicable to proceedings in state courts.2eKealey v. Faulkner, 18 Ohio Dec. 498 (1907).
7 The American law may be found in such cases as Snow v. Wheeler, 113
Mass. 179 (1873).
2 5 Section 6.
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entering wedge was driven in the famous Danbury Hatter's
case, 2 9 when union activities which would probably have been
held illegal under the state law as constituting a secondary boy-
cott were held to be illegal under the federal law as constituting
restraint of trade among the several states under the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act. Later, in 1921 in the case of Duplex Printing
Press Co. v. Deering,0 the Supreme Court held illegal as iA re-
straint of trade under the Sherman Act union activities which
under the law of the state where they took place. were not
illega, 31 In the second Coronado Coal Co. case, -32 decided in 1925,
the Supreme Court held that the activities of a local union in
organizing and conducting with violence a strike against a non-
union mine constituted a restraint of trade and commerce, and
that the defendant union was therefore liable under the Sher-
man Act to threefold damages. Finally, in United States v.
Brims 3 and Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen St ne
Cutters' Ass'n, 34 decided in 1926 and 1927, the doctrine of the
Duplex case was pushed still further; union regulations for-
bidding union members to work on materials produced by non-
union men were held illegal as in restraint of trade among the
several states and therefore prohibited under the Sherman Act.
Yet when the reverse situation presented itself in the case of
Industrial Association of San Francisco v. United States," and
union men sought to have certain building contractors and
dealers in building materials enjoined from combining to limit
sales of materials to employers pursuing an open shop policy,
the injunction was refused upon the ground that this did not
constitute illegal restraint of trade and commerce among the
several states. Many acute thinkers have been unable to dis-
cover any substantial difference in principle between the. Brims
case and the Bedford Cut Stone case on the one hand, and the
San Francisco Industrial Association case on the other. The
truth of the matter seems to be that under recent interpreta-
tions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts the limits of what con-
stitutes restraint of trade and commerce among the several
states are even more illusory than those of the common law doc-
trine; as a result, decisions under the Sherman Act especially
in the field of labor law have come to depend very largely upon
the underlying philosophies and social beliefs of individual
judges. In a field where the issues are of profound importance
9 Loewe v. Lawlor, supra note 3.
3o0254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172 (1921).
S1 See remarks of Brandeis, J., ibi 483, 41 Sup. Ct. at 182.
32 Coronado Coal Co. v, United Mine Workers, supra note 4.
33 272 U. S. 549, 47 Sup. Ct. 169 (1926).
3 274 U. S. 37, 47 Sup. Ct. 522 (1927).
35 268 U. S. 64, 45 Sup. Ct. 403 (1925).
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as between nation-wide class-conscious groups, it is vital that
the law be sufficiently definite to be capable of formulation by
the courts and of comprehension by all parties concerned. It is
high time that the anti-trust laws, designed to prevent the
monopolization of trade, should be amended so as to prevent
their being utilized as a weapon for attack upon the, principle
of collective bargaining. Here again is a situation where the
need of legislative safeguards in the field of substantive law is
imperative.
INDUCING BREACH OF CONTRACT
The doctrine which is being utilized to-day in American
courts perhaps more extensively than any other as. a weapon of
attack upon labor groups is that of inducing a breach of con-
tract3  This doctrine did not originate until 185003 and it was
not until almost the end of the nineteenth century that courts
recognized inducing breach of contract as a general tort Today
most jurisdictions hold that "maliciously" to induce another to
break a binding contract constitutes a tort, and as such gives
rise to a suit for damages or for an injunction. 8
But no courts have yet been able to agree on any definition
of what is meant by "maliciously." It is clear that not everiy
inducing of a breach of contract is actionable; for instance, the
superintendent of a soldiers' home, who after discovering that
a contract has been entered into between a saloon-keeper and
an inmate to furnish the inmate with a monthly supply of liquor
at a given price prevents the execution of the contract, surely
as For a discussion of the tort of inducing breach of contract, see Sayre,
Inducing Breach of Contract (1923) 36 H-Rv. L. Rzv. 663; Caxpenter, In-
terference uwth Contract Relations (1928) 41 1ARV. L. REV. '128.
=The doctrine originated with the case of Lunfley v. Gye, 2 E. & B.
216 (1853).
38 The courts of a few American states still deny the existence of such a
doctrine. See, for example, Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578, 33 Pac. 492
(1893); Chambers v. Baldwin, 91 Ky. 121, 15 S. W. 57 (1891); Boulier v.
Milacauey, 91 Ky. 135, 15 S. W. 60 (1991),; Swain v. Johnson, 151 N. C. 93,
65 S. E. 619 (1909); Sleeper v. Baker, 22 N. D. 386, 134 N. W. 716 (1911)';
cf. Glencoe Land & Gravel Co. v. Hudson Bros. Comm. Co., 138 Mo. 439, 40
S. W. 93 (1897) (doctrine rejected except where the relation of master and
servant exists); Kline v. Eubanks, 109 La. 241, 33 So. 211 (1902); M cCann
v. Wolff, 28 Mo. App. 447 (1888); Banks v. Eastern 1r. & Lumber Co.,
46 Wash. 610, 90 Pac. 1048 (1907). The earlier position of the New Yorlk
courts, at first expressly rejecting the doctrine of Lumley v. Gye, has been
materially modified by later cases. As illustrative of the present attitude,
see Posner Co. v. Jackson, 223 N. Y. 325, 119 N. El 573 (1918); Lamb
v. Cheney, 227 N. Y. 418, 125 N. E. 817 (1920). The earlier New York
doctrine may be found in such cases as Daly v. ornwell, 34 App. Div. 27,
54 N. Y. Supp. 107 (2d Dep't 1898); De Jong v. Behrman Co., 148 App.
Div. 37, 131 N. Y. Supp. 1083. (1st Dep't 1911).
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does not subject himself to damages therebyD any more than
the employer who by setting a higher wage scale in his factory
because he believes sound business requires a living wage causes
employees, in order to gain the higher wage, to break their con-
tracts of employment with a rival employer. Courts agree that
until "malice" is proved there is no tort; but since the concep-
tion of "malice" is as vague and undefined as it can be, here
again is a legal doctrine which, like that of conspiracy or re-
straint of trade, allows courts unconsciously to reach decisions
widely varying according to the personal bias or social view-
point of the individual judge.
Many courts are defining "malice" as "lack of justification"; 41
but this is only a restatement of the difficulty in other words.
What constitutes "justification"? The tort of inducing a breach
of contract was created to afford legal protection to the interest
of promised advantages as against people other than the promis-
see; and the fundamental difficulty in defining "malice" or "jus-
tification" in connection with this tort is the fact that the plain-
tiff's interest of promised advantages with peculiar frequency
comes into direct conflict with interests of others which the law
also undertakes to secure. When this conflict occurs one or the
other of the opposing interests must give way; which one it
will be must depend in the last analysis upon a nice balancing
of the interests concerned. There is no other way. No rigid
formula or precise definition can possibly spell out the solution;
the actual decision must inescapably depend upon policy.
It was this problem which underlay the famous and much dis-
cussed Hitchman case,41 decided by the Supreme Court in 1917.
The plaintiff company owning and operating a coal mine on a
non-union basis engaged employees only upon the understanding
that "if any man wanted to become a member of [the United
Mine Workers of America] he was at liberty to do so, but he
could not be a member of it and remain in the employ of the
Hitchman Company." One of the defendants, an agent of the
United Mine Workers, was sent into the Panhandle District of
West Virginia, where the plaintiff's mine was located, to union-
ize the Panhandle District mines, since these were running in
direct competition with those of the unionized "Central Competi-
tive Field," and underselling coal produced in the latter dis-
trict. Upon the defendant's seeking to enroll the plaintiff's
employees as members of the United Mine Workers, the plain-
tiff company sought and obtained an injunction restraining the
30 Cf. Rowan v. Butler, 171 Ind. 28, 85 N. E. 714 (1908).
40 See, for instance, South Wales Miners' Fed. v. Glamorgan Coal Co.,
[19051 A. C. 239.
•11 Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65
(1917).
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defendants fronr "interfering or attempting to interfere with
plaintiff's employees for the purpose of unionizing plaintiff's
mine... 2'
The exact basis of the decision has never been explained. 2
If the decision rests .upon the tort of maliciously inducing a
breach of contract, wherein lay the necessary '"malice"? Very
clearly there was no personal malevolence or ill will on the part
of the defendants towards the plaintiff. If the bitter competi-
tion of the non-union mines with the union mines could not be
ended, the union mines must close down and the United Mine
Workers lose their employment. In the effort to save their
economic existence they sought as their only remedy in the com-
petitive warfare the unionization of the plaintiff's mines. Free-
dom to act in trade competition constituted a very genuine
interest on the part of the defendants, and one which in the ab-
sence of the use of illegal means courts generally undertake to
protect; 43 in direct conflict with this was the plaintiff's inter-
est in its promised advantages. The balancing of these inter-
ests clearly depended upon a large question of policy; yet M/r.
Justice Pitney, who wrote the majority opinion, so far as his
language shows, apparently based the decision upon the simple
fact that the defendants with knowledge induced the plaintiff's
employees to break their individual contracts. To find the solu-
tion of legal and social problems as momentous and complex as
that involved in the Hitdh7mm case by a mere rule of thumb that
the defendant induced a breach of the plaintiff's contract is
completely to lose sight of the fundamental issues involved.A
Seizing upon the Hitchman decision, employers have found an
effective way to prevent peaceful and otherwise lawful union
activities by requiring present or prospective employees as the
price of employment to sign individual contracts against join-
ing any union. Thus entrenched, they are in a position to defy-
every effort: on the part of the unions to unionize their plants,
42 It is impossible to tell from the language of the majority opinion
what was the basis of the decision. In the mind of Mr. Chief Justice Taft
it was apparently deception and misrepresentation. See American Steel
Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 211, 42 Sup.
Ct. 7.2, 79 (1921). If deceit was the real basis of the decision it is un-
fortunate that the majority opinion did not make this clear or indicate
what kind of deceit or fraud vill constitute a basis for such an action.
See Sayre, op. cit. staim note 36, at 692, n. 81.
3 See the remarks of Bowen L. T., in the Mogul Steamship Co. v. Mc-
Gregor, Gow & Co, 23 Q. B. D. 598 (1889), aff'd, [1892] A. C. 25; cf.
Sorrell v. Smith, [1925J AA C. 700.
For a further discussion of the Hitchman ease, see Cook, P-r2*egcs
of Labor Uniow in the Stmuggle for Life (1918) 27 YArm L. T. 79; Sayre,
op. cit. supra note 36, at 690 et seq.; of. Interborough' Rapid Transit Co.




and by a system of strategic individual coidracts with their
employees they are able in many cases to prevent unions enter-
ing into a competitive struggle with them over the price of
labor. That courts would refuse in fields other than labor
law to allow competition to be effectually stifled by means of
strategic contracts with third parties seems clear. As declared
in the case of Citizens' Light,. Heat & Power Co. v. Montgomery
Light and Water Power Co,
4
1
"... the trader who has made a contract with another person
has a right, which the law will protect, to have that other keep
it. Other traders have the correlative right to solicit the cus-
tom to which the contract relates. Whatever damage results
to the first trader by the mere solicitation is privileged, so far
as the solicitor is, concerned, in the interest of proper freedom
of competition. Were the law otherwise, the first person oc-
cupying the field of public service in many localities, by pro-
curing long contracts to take water, light, and the like from him,
might entrench himself in a monopoly there for years, because
another thereafter could not solicit customers, thus bound, to
change their patronage to him, and thereby enable a rival en-
terprise to enter the field."
It is the absence of any clear judicial formulation of what con-
stitutes "malice" which leads different courts 'dealing with this
tort to reach such varying results.
If labor is to safeguard its position it must secure protection
against the abuse of a doctrine so ill-defined as that of induc-
ing breach of contract. Some see the remedy, as in the pro-
posed Shipstead bill,47 in legislation making illegal all promises
constituting or contained in contracts of employment between
employer and employee whereby the employee agrees not to
join a labor organization, or if he does join to withdraw from
the employment relation." If the employee's individual contract
4 See Brief for Defendants in Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Green,
published by Workers' Education Bureau Press, New York, 1928.
-1 171 Fed. 553, 560-561 (C. C. M.D. Ala. 1909).
47See, for instance, § 3 of the amended draft of the proposed Shipstead
Bill, as drafted by the Sub-committee of the Senate Committee on Judiciary.
The weakness of the proposed legislation is that it fails to cover individual
contracts between employer and employee relating to working conditions,
shop regulations, etc.
4 8 Arguments in support of such legislation are based upon analogies
existing in other fields of law. For instance, because of the similar factual
inequality which exists between railway companies and individual shippers,
contracts whereby common carriers relieve themselves from liability for
negligence or misconduct are even at common law held illegal as against
public policy and void. On the other 'hand, in' spite of this inequality,
ordinary contracts of shipment entered into between the individual shipper
and the carrier are valid.
Similar situations have been recognized in other fields of law where
because of gross inequality of bargaining power courts havd refused to
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is made void, the inducing of its breach cannot be tortious, and
no injunction or suit for damages can therefore be based upon
it.
Others have proposed a more direct remedy. If the tort be-
cause of the inescapable vagueness of its limits is peculiarly li-
able to abuse in those fields where passion and prejudice run
strongest, why not abolish the tort in those fields? Since the
doctrine never existed prior to 1853 and was unknown in the
field of labor disputes before the end of the last century, its
abolition in labor cases could not work very serious harm; and
as the abuse of. the doctrine is almost wholly confined to labor
cases, there is much to be said in favor of, legislation providing
for its complete abolition in the field of trade disputes.
PARTICULAR MEASURES UTILIZED IN LABOR DISPUTES
St'ikes to Unionize a, Skop
If social injustice is to be avoided, the legality of certain forms
of collective bargaining frequently resorted to in the competi-
tive struggle must be assured, irrespective of whether they are
utilized by employers or employees. For instance, whether the
concerted action takes the form of the strike or the lockout should
make no difference as to its legality. Under present day law it
is elementary that while some strikes are legal, others are
illegal, and that the legality or illegality of the strike depends
upon its purpose or object.50 If, for instance, the object is to
lend their power to enforce certain kinds of contracts. Such situations
include contracts between:
(1) Lender and borrower of money.
(2) Seller and, buyer of property on credit.
(3) Corporation and investor.
(4) Fire insurance company and insured.
(5) Life insurance company and insured.
(6) Common carriers and their patrons.
(7) Public utility companies and their customers.
(8) Banks and depositors.
(9) Surety companies and their customers.
(10) Landlord and tenant.
(11) Corporate seller and individual buyer of commodities.
As to the general subject, see Pound, i.bcrty -of ContraCt (1909) 18 YALE
L. 3. 454, 482 et seq. See cases collected in Brief for Defendants in Inter-
borough Rapid Transit Co. v. Green, supra note 45, at 314-330.
49 It was along this line that England sought the remedy. In the Trade
Disputes Act of 1906 it is provided that "an act done by a person in
contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute shall, not be actionable on
the ground only that it induces some other person to break a contract
of employment. . . . " 6 EDW. VII, c. 47, § 3. As to the passage of
this Act see SmN-Y mo BEAnCE:c WEBB, op. cit. supra note 15, at 604
et seq.
5 See De Minico v. Craig, 207 Mass. 593, 598, 94 N. E. 317, 319 (1911),
where Loring, J., said: "Whether the purpose for vhich a strike is in-
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secure higher wages or shorter working hours, although form-
erly such strikes were -held illegal,5' today in every state of the
Union they are held entirely legal. On the other hand, in the
majority of states: (although not in all , strikes to enforce
secondaiy boycotts, or to compel employers to pay fines levied
upon them by unions, or to exert political pressure, are gen-
erally held illegal. Courts are hopelessly divided as to whether a
strike to unionize a shop or in pursuance thereo to compel the
discharge of a non-union employee is legal or illegal. New
York," Illinois,53 California, "4 Minnesota," and a substantial
group of other states -5 hold such a strike legal. But there are
important states, such as Massachusetts,"7 Pennsylvania,"5 and
New Jersey, 9 which hold the strike to unionize a shop illegal."'
The holding of such a strike illegal seems manifestly unjust.
Under the existig law it is clear that employers have the un-
questioned right, acting singly or in association, to discharge
employees because they belong to a union. If the employers
have this right, why should the employees not possess an exactly
similar right, acting singly or in association, to cease working
for an employer because he runs a non-union shop? 01 In other
stituted is or is not a legal justification for it, is a question of law to be
decided by the court. To justify interference -with the rights of others
the strikers must in good faith strike for a purpose which the court d6-
cides to be a legal justification for such interference. To make a strike
a legal strike it is necessary that the strikers should have acted in good
faith in striking for al puirpose which the court holds to have been a legal
purpose for a strike. . ..
"Philadelphia Cordwainers' Case, supra note 11.
59 Nat'l Protective Ass'n v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369
(1902); Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157
N. E. 130 (1927).
A3 Kemp v. Divisionl No. 241, 255 III. 213, 99 N. E. 389 (1912).
54 Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324 (1909); Park-
inson v. Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581, 98 Pac. 1027 (1908).
W Grant Construction Co. v. St. Paul Bldg. Trades Council, 136 Minn.
167, 161 N. W. 520, 1055 (191'); see Gray v. Bldg. Trades Council, 91
Minn. 171, 185, 97 N. W. 663, 668 (1903).
66 See, as typical cases, Cohn & Roth Electric Co. vi Bricklayers' Union,
92 Conn. 161, 101 At]. 659 (1917); Jetton-Dekde Lumber Co. v. Mather,
53 Fla. 969, 43 So. 590 (1907); Clemmitt v. Watson, 14 Ind. App. 38, 42
N. R. 367 (1895) ; State v. Employers of Labor, 102 Neb. 768, 774, 169 N.
W. 717, 719 (1918); Roddy v. United Mine Workers, 41 0ka. 621; 139
Pac. 126 (1914).
=Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E. 1011 (1900).
ZErdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, 56 AtI. 327 (1903); Bausbach v.
Reiff, 244 Pa. 559, 91" AtI. 224 (1914).
59 Ruddy v. Plumbers, 79 N. J. L. 467, 75 Atl. 742 (1910).
60 If illegal, of course the strike can be enjoined and made the subject
.of heavy damage suits against the individual strikers, and their wages
attached.
O8 In the cases of Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277
(1908) and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 35 Sup. Cto 240 (1915), it
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words, employees should be as free to strike as the employer
is free, under the existing law, to discharge, in order to accom-
plish the unionization or the de-unionization of a shop, trade,
or industry.
Since the right to demand exclusively union conditions lies
at the very foundation of the principle of collective bargaining,
the legality of the strike to unionize a shop must be of the lar-
gest concern to those seeking to uphold the principle of collective
bargaining. In all those jurisdictions, therefore, where the
strike to unionize a shop or to compel the discharge of a non-
union employee is held illegal, legislation should be sought legal-
izing the strike or the trade agreement for such a purpose. In
such cases the mere prohibition of an injunction suit as in the
proposed Shipstead Bill will not afford adequate protection; for
if the strike is illegal the prohibition of the injunction remedy
will only increase the likelihood of heavy damage suits in which
the wages and property of individual strikers may be attached.9
In New York, Illinois and othen states, as well as in England,
the courts without the aid of specific legislation have upheld the
legality of the strike to unionize a shop; but in states like Mas-
sachusetts, where the courts have held such strikes illegal,
legislation offers the only solution.03
was held that the right of the employer to discharge employees for any
or no reason is so sacred that a. law. making criminal the discharge of an
employee because of his being a union man is unconstitutional. If the
right of the employer to discharge for any reason or no reason was held by
the United States to be so sacred that no state could pass a law infringing
this constitutional right, it would seem that for the same reason the
right of the employee to cease his work should be as sacred, and that his
action should not be held illegal if the reason for his ceasing work along
with other employees is to secure the exclusive employment of union men
in a shop, trade, or industry. Indeed,. this reasoning seems to be adopted
by the United State§ Supreme Court in Coppage v.- Kansas, supra. -Mr.
Justice Pitney, delivering the opinion of the Court in that case, said:
"Can it be doubted that a labor organization . . . has the inherent
and constitutional right to deny membership to any man who vill not
agree that during such membership he will not, accept or retain employ-
ment in company -with non-union men? Or that a union has the constitu-
tional right to decline proffered employment unless the employer Will agree
not, to employ any non-union men?" Ibi. 19, 35 Sup. Ct. at 246. •
3 Cf. Alden Bros. Co. v. Dunn, 162 N. E. 773 (Mass. 1928),
03 For the English rule upholding the legality of the strike, cf. White v.
Riley, [1921] 1 Ch. 1; Wolstenholme v. Ariss, [1920] 2 Ch. 403.
Owing to such unfortunate decisions as Plant v. Woods, mtpra note
57, and subsequent decisions holding the strike to unionize a shop illegal,
the law of Massachusetts as to the legality of strikes has been reduced
to a state of chaos. Neither the Massachusetts courts nor any one else
has been able to reconcile or adequately to explain such conflicting decisions
as Plant v. Woods (strike to compel discharge of non-union painters held
unlawful),; Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 153 (1906) (strike
to compel discharge of pointers so as to secure vork for union bricklayers
1930]
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The form which such legislation should take must depend
upon the state of the substantive law in the particular jurisdic-
tion concerned. A carefully framed bill was introduced into
the Massachusetts legislature by the state branch of the Ameri-
can Federation of Labor in the winter of 1929, phrased as fol-
lows:
"Section 1. That the following purposes shall not be deemed
to be against public policy nor shall they render unlawful other-
wise lawful efforts directed toward their attainment:-
(a) Securing the exclusive employment of persons belonging
or not belonging to any organization, association or union in any
shop, trade or industry.
(b) Insisting that negotiations between employers and em-
ployees for the making or maintaining of trade agreements, for
the arrangement of terms and conditions of employment or for
the settlement of disputes, shall be carried on and concluded
with those representatives of persons in any shop, trade or in-
dustry,. designated in the manner that may be provided in their
corporate organization or unincorporated association or by other
means of collective action.
"Section 2. That no agreement between an employer or em-
ployers and employees or the representatives of any of them
shall be deemed to be invalid or illegal because it provides for
the exclusive employment in any shop, trade or industry, of
persons belonging to any organization, association or union.
"Section 8. That no strike, lockout, or other concerted action
of an otherwise lawful nature by employers or employees or
the representatives of any of them for the purpose or purposes
expressed in section one of this act or to secure or enforce an
agreement falling within the terms of section two of this act
shall) be deemed illegal because of it being for such purpose or
purposes.
"Section 4. That for the purposes of this act the expression
'employees' shall not be restricted to mean workers in the em-
ploy of a particular employer or employers, but shall include all
held lawful); Reynolds v. Davis, 198 Mass. 294, 84 N. E. 457 (1908)
(sirike against the posting of open-shop rules held unlawful); Minasian v.
Osborne, 210 Mass. 250, 96 N. E. 1036 (1911) (strike to compel discharge
of a non-union unskilled assistant held lawful); Haverhill Theatre v.
Gillin, 229 Mass. 413, 118 N. E. 671 (1918) (strike of union musicians
to enforce a union regulation not to play for any employer employing non-
union musicians held unlawful); Shinsky v. O'Neil, 232 Mass. 99, 121 N.
E. 790 (1919) (concerted unioA.-efforts to compel discharge of a non-union
employee in pursuance of a trade agreement for a closed shop held law-
ful) ; Walton Lunch Co. v. Kearney, 236 Mass. 310, 128 N. B. 429 (1920)
(held, employer could not enjoin his employees from striking for a trade
agreement embodying a union shop if he intentionally failed to keep an
engagement to meet with the defendants); Mechanics Foundry & Machine
Co. v. Lynch, 236 Mass. 504, 128 N. E. 877 (1920) (strike to compel
employer to reemploy a certain union leader held unlawful).; Ryan v.
Hayes, 243 Mass. 168, 137 N. E. 344 (1922) (enforcement of trade agree-
ment providing for the exclusive employment of union men held lawful).
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persons who are or have been employed or who seek employment
in any shop, trade or industry.
"Section 5. If any provision of this act or the application
thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the re-
mainder of the act and application of such provisions as to other
persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby."
Boycotting
No part of the law is in. a more formless or chaotic condition
than the law of boycotts. There is no agreement among legal
students or among the courts themselves as to exactly whiat con-
stitutes a boycott or as to what boycotts, if any, are illegal.0 '
So far as formulated doctrines are concerned, each judge is left
too largely to his own innate feelings to determine the legality
or illegality of any given boycott. Where an association of mas-
ter plumbers passed a regulation that no member should pur-
chase plumbing material from any wholesaler guilty of selling
to, non-members of the association, and a master plumber not
a member of the association, facing ruin because of not being
able to buy material, sought to enjoin the enforcement of the
boycott, injunctive relief was denied on the ground that here
"The most casual observation -ill disclose that scarcely any two
courts treating of the subject [i.e., the boycott] formulate the same def-
inition."-Per Halloway, J., in Lindsay v. Montana Fed. of Labor, 37
Mont. 264, 272, 96 Pac. 127, 129 (1908). "But the vord [ie., boycott] is
of vague signification, and no accurate and exclusive definition has, so far
as I kunow, ever been given:'--Per Hough, J., in Gill Engraving Co. v.
Doerr, 214 Fed. 11, 118 (S. D. N. Y. 1914).
In Mills v. United States Printing Co., 99 App. Div. 605, 91 N. Y. Supp.
185 (2d Dep't 1904), aff'd, 199 N. Y. 76, 92 N. E. 214 (1910), Jenhs,
J., said: "There is no commonly accepted definition of the verb. Some
courts have defined it as necessarily implying violence, or intimidation, or
the threat thereof; others as but necessarily implying abstention. A
may refuse to trade vith B unless B changes a certain policy, and A may
think that his attitude is necessary for his own -welfare and protection. It
cannot be contended that A thereby offends the law. . . . Judge Cooley-
in his -work on Torts (2d ed., p. 328) says: 'It is a part of every man's
civil right that he be left at liberty to refuse business relations with any
person -whomsoever, -whether the refusal rests upon reason, or is the
result of whim, caprice, prejudice or malice. With his reasons neither the
public nor third persons have any legal concern.' If A may take this
step, it does not seem logical to hold that A and C together may nok and.
may not, by argument, persuasion and entreaty, bring f) and B to their
side." biL 609, 91 N. Y. Supp. at 188.
Sir Charles Russel in his opening speech before the Parnell Commission
said: "My lords, in this matter of boycotting, may I be forgiven for
using the celebrated exclamation of Dr. Johnson, and say, 'Let us clear
our minds of cant? Boycotting has existed from the earliest times that
human society existed. It is only a question of degree. Up to a certain




was no illegal boycott. 5 Other courts have similarly denied
relief where secondary boycotts have been practiced as an in-
cident in a competitive struggle waged by commercial associa-
tions." But if an association of trade unionists enforce a regu-
lation that no member shall work for any one who patronizes
a non-union employer, an overwhelming majority of courts
brand such conduct as an illegal boycott, and by reason of its
illegality freely' enjoin itY. Unfortunately, the courts have
failed to point out any distinction between these two lines of
cases; and the only substantial distinction apparent is that in
the former, the defendants are merely commercial organiza-
tions, in the latter, labor organizations. Surely the law should
be the same, irrespective of the character of the defendants.
Additional uncertainty arises from the distinction drawn be-
tween primary and secondary boycotts. A large majority of
courts agree that the primary boycott is legal, and that the
secondary boycott, if practiced by a labor group, is illegal. But
among judges there is utter failure to agree on how to draw
the line between the primary and the secondary boycott. If
the law holding illegal a secondary boycott is to be justified,
it must be upon the ground of protecting neutral third parties
unconnected with the struggle from being coerced against their
will to act so as to damage another. On the other hand, so
long as no illegal end is pursued and no illegal means used,
and so long as neutral third parties unconnected with the
struggle are not coerced to take sides against their will, no law
should prevent all having common interests or sympathies from
acting in concert to promote their common cause.68 Upon these
6 5Macauley Bros. v. Tierney, 19 R. 1. 255, 33 At]. 1 (1895).
66 See, for instance, Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 228, 55 N. W.
1119 (1893); Montgomery Ward v. South Dakota Ass'n, 150 Fed. 413
(C. C. D. S. D. 1907):; Sorrell v. Smith, supra note 43; of. Mogul Steam-
ship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., supra note 43.
G7 See, for instance, Wilson v. Hey, 232 Ill. 389, 83 N. E. 928 (1908).;
Gray v. Bldg. Trades Council, supra note 55; Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co.,
83 Fed. 912 (C. C. A. 8th, 1897), and a long line of similar decisions. On
the other hand, some courts have held the secondary boycott even when
practiced by labor groups legal. See, .for instance, Pierce v. Stablemen's
Union, supra note 54; cf. Lindsay & Co. v. Montana! Fed. of Labor, supra
note 64.
Is As illustrative decisions to this effect, see Mills v. United States Print-
ing Co., supra note 64; Kearney v. Lloyd, L. R. Ireland, 26 Q. B. & Ex.
Div. 268 (1890). In Wilson v. Hey, supra note 67, at 396, 83 N. E. at
929, Cartwright, J., delivering the majority opinion, said: "It is not wrong
for members of a union to cease patronizing any one when they regard
it for their interest to do so, but they have no right to compel others to
break off business relations with the one from whom they have withdrawn
their patronage, and to do this by unlawful means,. with the motive of
injuring such person."
Scott and Farmer, N3., -in the same case, ibid. 399, 83 N. E. at 931 (dis-
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fundamentals should be drawn the line bet.een the "primary"
and the "secondary" boycott; 6 and the "primary" boycott, i.e.,
the withholding of labor or of patronage from one against
whom an economic struggle is being waged without the coercion
of any third party, entirely unconnected with the struggle, should
be defined by legislation and declared not per se illegal. Under
such legislation all having common interests in the competitive
struggle, whether or not they happen to be in the same shop,
trade, or industry, should be permitted to act collectively, so long
as no illegal means are used, against all having opposing com-
mon interests.0 No taint of illegality by reason of the boycott
should attach unless the person against whom collective pres- .
sure is directly brought is shown to have no community of
economic interest with the group against whom the economic
struggle is Waged and also shown to be not in competition with
the boycotting group. Legislation such as this would of course
legalize many so-called sympathetic strikes.7
Picketing
Picketing is another problem of substantive law calling for
legislative action and clarification. Upon the question of the
legality of picketing courts are also hopelessly divided. The
majority hold that picketing is entirely lawful, so long as it
is peaceful and does not in fact involve intimidation.72  A mi-
senting in respect to other points) : "The law is that an individual may
refrain from trading or dealing with any particular person, and that two
or more individuals may agree among themselves that they will not trade
or deal with a certain person, and may give notice to others that they have
made such an agreement. (Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Mete. (Mass.) 111;
Bowen v. Matheson, 14 Alien (Mass.) 499; Macauley v. Tierney, 19 R.
L 225, 83 Atl. 1; Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 iinn. 223, 55 N. W. 1119;
Cote v. Murphy, 159 Pa. 420, 28 AtI. 190; Longshore Printing Co. v.
Howell, 26 Ore. 527, 88 Pac. 547; National Protective Ass'n v. Cumming,
170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369; 18 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, Zd ed., p. 87).
Appellants did nothing more."
In Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1, 14, Chapman, C. J., said: 'Every
man has a right to . . . refuse to deal with any man or class of men.
And it is no crime for any number of persons, without an unlawful object
in view, to associate themselves together and agree that they will not 'work
for or deal 'with certain men or classes of men, or work under a certain
price, or -without certain conditions."
69 This seeins to be the line drawn by leading text writers. See MARTnT,
TAE LAW Or LABo UxioNs (1910) § 71; CLARI, Tim LAW or Tim Ez!-
PLoymNT OF LABOR (1911) 289, 290. See, also, Brandeis, J., in Truax
v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 364, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 141, n. 28 (1921) ; Mills
v. United States Printing Co., supra note 64.
TO Cf. § 9 (b) of the amended draft of the proposed Shipstead bill
=It is extremely doubtful whether as a matter of fact sympathetic
strikes are actually prevented by the present "law in action."
72 Pope Motor Car Co. v. Keegan, 150 Fed. 148 (C. C. N. D. Ohio 1906);
Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers' Local Union, 165
1930]
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nority holds that there "can be no such thing as peaceful picket-
ing, any more than there can be chaste vulgarity, or peaceful
mobbing, or lawful lynching." 7- When the question came be-
fore the United States Supreme Court,74 the judges failed satis-
factorily to settle this issue,7  and the actual decision only
Ind. 421, 430, 431, 75 N. E. 877 (1905); Jones v. Van Winkle Gin &
Machine Works, 131 Ga. 336, 340, 62 S. E. 236 (1908); Steffes v. Motion
Picture Union, 136 Minn. 200, 161 N. W. 524 (1917); Root v. Anderson,
207 S. W. 255 (Mo. App. 1918); Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. Glass
Bottle Blowers' Ass'n, 59 N. J. Eq. 49, 46 At]. 208 (1899); Fletcher Co.
v. Int. Ass'n of Machinists, 55 At]. 1077 (N. J. Eq. 1903)1; Reynolds v.
Everett, 17 N. Y. Supp. 264 (Sup. Ct. 1893), aff'd, 144 N. Y. 189, 39 N.
E. 72 (1894); Levy v. Rosenstein, 66 N. Y. Supp. 101 (Sup. Ct. 1900);
Krebs v. Rosenstein, 31 Misc. 661, 66 N. Y. Supp. 42 (Sup. Ct. 1900);
Foster v. Retail Clerks' Int. Prot. Ass'n, 39 Misc. 48, 78 N. Y. Supp. 860
(Sup. Ct. 1902); Mil8 v. U. S. Printing Co., supra note 64; Searle Mfg.
Co. v. Terry, 56 Misc. 265, 106 N. Y. Supp. 438 (Sup. Ct. 1905); Jones
v. Maher, 62 Misc. 3881 116 N. Y. Supp. 180 (Sup. Ct. 1909); Michaels
v. Hillman, 112 Misc. 395, 183 N. Y. Supp. 195 (Sup. Ct. 1920) ; McCormick
v. Union, 13 Ohio Cir. UE. (N. .) 545 (1911); Greenfield v. Central Labor
Council, 192 Pac. 783 (Ore. 1920),; Everett Waddey Co. v. Richmond Typo-
graphical Union, 105 Va. 188, 197, 53 S. E. 273 (1906); Goldfield Consoli-
dated Mining Co. v. Goldfield Miners' Union, 159 Fed. 500, 521 (C. C. D.
Nev, 1908); Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45 (C.
C. A. 7th, 1908); Niles-Bernent-Pond Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, 246 Fed.
851, 860 (S. D. Ohio 1917). See further cases cited in Truax v. Corrigan,
supral note 69, at 365, n. 29, par. 2, 42 Sup. Ct. at 142.
73 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582 (C. C. S. D. Iowa 1905).
Accord: Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, supra note 54; Rosenberg v. Retail
Clerks' Ass'n,' 27 Cal. App. Dec. 769 (1918); Barnes v. Chicago Typo-
graphical Union, 232 Ill. 424, 83 N. E. 932 (1908); Franklin Union. v.
People, 220 Ill. 355, 77 N. E. 176 (1906); Lyon & Healy v. Piano, etc.
Workers' -Union, 289 Il. 176, 124 N. E. 443 (1919) ; Vegelahn v. Guntner,
167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077 (1896) (but of. dissenting opinions); Beck
v. Ry. Teamsters' Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 18 (1898)1; Clarage v.
Luphringer, 202 Mich. 62, 168 N. W. 440 (1918); Jonas Glass Co. v.
Glass Blowers' Ass'n, 72 N. J. Eq. 653, 66 Atl. 958 (1907), ffd', 77 N. J.
Eq. 219, 79 Atl. 262 (1911); Baldwin Lumnber Co. v. Brotherhood of Team-
sters, 91 N. J. Eq. 240, 109 AtI. 147 (1920); cf. Webb v. Cooks', etc. Union,
205 S. W. 465 (Tex: Civ. App. 1918) (acts amounting, to intimidation);
Baasch v. Cooks', etc. Union, 99 Wash. 378, 169 Pac. 843 (1918).
7-1 American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, supra
note 42.
75 This is so because, as evidenced by later remarks, the judges had widely
differing ideas as to what constitutes "picketing." See Truax v. Corrigan,
supra note 69, at 340, 42 Sup. Ct. at 132, where Taft, C. J., in speaking
of the decision of American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Trades Council,
supra note 42, said: "We held that . . . picketing was unlawful, and
that it might be enjoined as such, and that peaceful picketing was a con-
tradiction in terms."
On the other hand, Brandeis, J., in the same case, also referring to the
Tri-City decision, said: "This court has recently held that peaceful picket-
ing is not unlawful." Truax v. Corrigan, supra note 69, at 871, 42 Sup.
Ct. at 144.
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served to create fresh problems. Mr. Chief Justice Taft, in
Tendering the opinion of the Court, broadly declared that labor
unions had the unquestioned right of peaceful persuasion;"
but by his limiting the unions to a single picket at each gat in
a plant employing at the time some 350 men, the practical ex-
ercise of the right was very seriously curtailed if not denied.
Just what the law covering picketing is today remains in the
greatest uncertainty. It is vital to their growth and very ex-
istence that unions should have the right to extend their mem-
bership by peacefully persuading others to join their ranks; yet
when it comes to the practical exercise of this right at critical
moments, under the present uncertainty of the law no union
,can feel secure 77
The "Unfah DxvList"
Under the existing common law, where not changed by stat-
ute, it is not unlawful for associations of employers to blacklist
employees, i. e., to circulate among themselves lists of employees
under agreement that no employer member of the association
shall give employment to a blacklisted employee28 But when
'0 See American Steel Foundries v. Tni-City Central Trades Council,
suptra note 42, at 209, 42 Sup. Ct. at 78, where Taft, C. J., said: "Labor
unions are recognized by the Clayton Act as legal when.instituted for
mutual help and lawfully carrying out their legitimate objects. They
have long been thus recognized by the courts. They were organized out of
the -necessities of the situation. A single employee was helpless in dealing
with an employer . . . Union was essential to give laborers opportunity
to deal on equality with their employer . . . The strike became a lawful
instrument in a lawful economic struggle or competition between employer
and employees as to the share or division between them of the joint prod-
uct of labor and capital. To render this combination at all effective,
employees must make their combination extend beyond one shop. It is
helpful to have as many as may be in the same trade in the same com-
munity united, because in the competition betwe.n employers they are
bound to be affected by the standard of wages of their trade in the
neighborhood. Therefore, they may use all lawful propaganda to enlarge
their membership and especially among those whose labor at lower wages
will injure their whole guild. It is impossible to hold such persuasion and
propaganda without more, to be -ithout excuse and malicious."
In England legislation -as passed in 1906 (Trade Disputes Act, supra
note 49, § 2) providing that " . . . it shall be lfwful for one or more
persons, acting on their own behalf or on behalf of a trade union or of an
individual employer or firm in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dis-
pute, to attend at or near a house or place where a person resides or works
or carries on business or happens to be, if they so attend merely for the
purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information or of peace-
fully persuading any person to work or abstain from working.' For for-
mer English legislation, see Acts of 6 GEo. IV, c. 129, § 3 (1825); 22 VicT.
c. 34, § 1 (1859); 34 & 35 VIcT. c. 32, § 1 (1871); and 38 & 39 Vic. c.
86, § 7 (1875).
I SBoyer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 124 Fed. 246 (C. C. E. D. Mo.
1903); Willis v. Lluscogee Mg. Co., 120 Ga. 597, 48 S. E. 177 (1904);
Tilbury v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 7 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925).
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employees similarly seek to circulate an "unfair list," containing
the names of employers whom trade union members are urged
not to patronize, there is a w,'ell pronounced tendency among
some courts to hold this illegal and therefore enjoinable.70 If'
the blacldist, the weapon of employers, is held legal, the "un-
fair list," the analogous weapon of employees, should similarly-
be madd legal. It is difficult to see any substantial difference in
principle between the two. What is sauce for the goose is sauce
for the gander.
CONCLUSION
In the foregoing discussion it has not been meant to suggest.
that justice should be reduced to a mere process of mechanics.
and that judges should be stripped of all discretionary power.
Decisions must and should depend to some extent upon the vary-
ing viewpoints of individual judges. But the play of judicial
discretion should be confined within fixed limits. The decision.
of a conspiracy or a boycott case should be controlled by fixed
and ascertainable legal doctrines, and not left to the unguided,
reactions of individual judges, no matter how able or high mind-
ed the individu.als may be. In no other field of law is this so
vitally important as in the settlement of labor disputes. No.
other cases involve questions- fraught with such strong precon-.
ceptions and prejudices and yet, because of their social reper-
cussions, of such intense practical and nation-wide importance..
Here if anywhere the law should be clear, well understood,
definite. Yet in no other field of law today is there so much.
uncertainty, so many ill-defined or undefined doctrines, such wide.
latitude for the play of social prejudice or economic bias. The
very statement of the problem shows the danger. Past experi-
ence has shown that the courts if left to themselves will not.
cure the difficulty. Carefully framed legislation is necessary.
Labor should not be led to believe that the winning of the.
Shipstead Anti-Injunction Bill will mean for it adequate pro-
tection in the courts. Such a belief spells only disillusionment
and resulting social disorder. The problem goes very much.
deeper than the mere injunction evil. What is necessary is an
intensive study of the substantive law, as well as of abuses in
procedure, by local groups in every state, and as a result of such
studyi, and growing out of it, carefully drafted bills framed to.
meet the situation and needs in each state.80 Such legislation
7C Cf. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 437, 31 Sup..
Ct. 492, 496 (1911); Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U. S. 522, 534, 35 Sup. Ct. 170,
172 (1915).
8o This was the course followed by the Massachusetts State Branch of'
the American Federation of Labor in the fall of 1928. A small group-
was appointed to study intensively the legal problems arising in Massa-.
chusetts; and as a result of this study a constructive program was formu--
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must be sought in Congress as well as in state legislatures, and
there, too, it should cover abuses in the substantive as well as
in the procedural law, so far as the matter falls within federal
jurisdttion.
Only thus can the problem be successfully met. And it is
of importance for all to remember that it is more than a mere
problem of law. It is a profound social problem as well; and
it demands determined and constructive effort on the part of
all who believe in the reign of law and who care for the main-
tenance of American traditions.
lated, and with the help of expert legal advice a very carefully drawn bill
was prepared.
